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involves some problems

  • 1 involves some problems

    Универсальный англо-русский словарь > involves some problems

  • 2 Artificial Intelligence

       In my opinion, none of [these programs] does even remote justice to the complexity of human mental processes. Unlike men, "artificially intelligent" programs tend to be single minded, undistractable, and unemotional. (Neisser, 1967, p. 9)
       Future progress in [artificial intelligence] will depend on the development of both practical and theoretical knowledge.... As regards theoretical knowledge, some have sought a unified theory of artificial intelligence. My view is that artificial intelligence is (or soon will be) an engineering discipline since its primary goal is to build things. (Nilsson, 1971, pp. vii-viii)
       Most workers in AI [artificial intelligence] research and in related fields confess to a pronounced feeling of disappointment in what has been achieved in the last 25 years. Workers entered the field around 1950, and even around 1960, with high hopes that are very far from being realized in 1972. In no part of the field have the discoveries made so far produced the major impact that was then promised.... In the meantime, claims and predictions regarding the potential results of AI research had been publicized which went even farther than the expectations of the majority of workers in the field, whose embarrassments have been added to by the lamentable failure of such inflated predictions....
       When able and respected scientists write in letters to the present author that AI, the major goal of computing science, represents "another step in the general process of evolution"; that possibilities in the 1980s include an all-purpose intelligence on a human-scale knowledge base; that awe-inspiring possibilities suggest themselves based on machine intelligence exceeding human intelligence by the year 2000 [one has the right to be skeptical]. (Lighthill, 1972, p. 17)
       4) Just as Astronomy Succeeded Astrology, the Discovery of Intellectual Processes in Machines Should Lead to a Science, Eventually
       Just as astronomy succeeded astrology, following Kepler's discovery of planetary regularities, the discoveries of these many principles in empirical explorations on intellectual processes in machines should lead to a science, eventually. (Minsky & Papert, 1973, p. 11)
       Many problems arise in experiments on machine intelligence because things obvious to any person are not represented in any program. One can pull with a string, but one cannot push with one.... Simple facts like these caused serious problems when Charniak attempted to extend Bobrow's "Student" program to more realistic applications, and they have not been faced up to until now. (Minsky & Papert, 1973, p. 77)
       What do we mean by [a symbolic] "description"? We do not mean to suggest that our descriptions must be made of strings of ordinary language words (although they might be). The simplest kind of description is a structure in which some features of a situation are represented by single ("primitive") symbols, and relations between those features are represented by other symbols-or by other features of the way the description is put together. (Minsky & Papert, 1973, p. 11)
       [AI is] the use of computer programs and programming techniques to cast light on the principles of intelligence in general and human thought in particular. (Boden, 1977, p. 5)
       The word you look for and hardly ever see in the early AI literature is the word knowledge. They didn't believe you have to know anything, you could always rework it all.... In fact 1967 is the turning point in my mind when there was enough feeling that the old ideas of general principles had to go.... I came up with an argument for what I called the primacy of expertise, and at the time I called the other guys the generalists. (Moses, quoted in McCorduck, 1979, pp. 228-229)
       9) Artificial Intelligence Is Psychology in a Particularly Pure and Abstract Form
       The basic idea of cognitive science is that intelligent beings are semantic engines-in other words, automatic formal systems with interpretations under which they consistently make sense. We can now see why this includes psychology and artificial intelligence on a more or less equal footing: people and intelligent computers (if and when there are any) turn out to be merely different manifestations of the same underlying phenomenon. Moreover, with universal hardware, any semantic engine can in principle be formally imitated by a computer if only the right program can be found. And that will guarantee semantic imitation as well, since (given the appropriate formal behavior) the semantics is "taking care of itself" anyway. Thus we also see why, from this perspective, artificial intelligence can be regarded as psychology in a particularly pure and abstract form. The same fundamental structures are under investigation, but in AI, all the relevant parameters are under direct experimental control (in the programming), without any messy physiology or ethics to get in the way. (Haugeland, 1981b, p. 31)
       There are many different kinds of reasoning one might imagine:
        Formal reasoning involves the syntactic manipulation of data structures to deduce new ones following prespecified rules of inference. Mathematical logic is the archetypical formal representation. Procedural reasoning uses simulation to answer questions and solve problems. When we use a program to answer What is the sum of 3 and 4? it uses, or "runs," a procedural model of arithmetic. Reasoning by analogy seems to be a very natural mode of thought for humans but, so far, difficult to accomplish in AI programs. The idea is that when you ask the question Can robins fly? the system might reason that "robins are like sparrows, and I know that sparrows can fly, so robins probably can fly."
        Generalization and abstraction are also natural reasoning process for humans that are difficult to pin down well enough to implement in a program. If one knows that Robins have wings, that Sparrows have wings, and that Blue jays have wings, eventually one will believe that All birds have wings. This capability may be at the core of most human learning, but it has not yet become a useful technique in AI.... Meta- level reasoning is demonstrated by the way one answers the question What is Paul Newman's telephone number? You might reason that "if I knew Paul Newman's number, I would know that I knew it, because it is a notable fact." This involves using "knowledge about what you know," in particular, about the extent of your knowledge and about the importance of certain facts. Recent research in psychology and AI indicates that meta-level reasoning may play a central role in human cognitive processing. (Barr & Feigenbaum, 1981, pp. 146-147)
       Suffice it to say that programs already exist that can do things-or, at the very least, appear to be beginning to do things-which ill-informed critics have asserted a priori to be impossible. Examples include: perceiving in a holistic as opposed to an atomistic way; using language creatively; translating sensibly from one language to another by way of a language-neutral semantic representation; planning acts in a broad and sketchy fashion, the details being decided only in execution; distinguishing between different species of emotional reaction according to the psychological context of the subject. (Boden, 1981, p. 33)
       Can the synthesis of Man and Machine ever be stable, or will the purely organic component become such a hindrance that it has to be discarded? If this eventually happens-and I have... good reasons for thinking that it must-we have nothing to regret and certainly nothing to fear. (Clarke, 1984, p. 243)
       The thesis of GOFAI... is not that the processes underlying intelligence can be described symbolically... but that they are symbolic. (Haugeland, 1985, p. 113)
        14) Artificial Intelligence Provides a Useful Approach to Psychological and Psychiatric Theory Formation
       It is all very well formulating psychological and psychiatric theories verbally but, when using natural language (even technical jargon), it is difficult to recognise when a theory is complete; oversights are all too easily made, gaps too readily left. This is a point which is generally recognised to be true and it is for precisely this reason that the behavioural sciences attempt to follow the natural sciences in using "classical" mathematics as a more rigorous descriptive language. However, it is an unfortunate fact that, with a few notable exceptions, there has been a marked lack of success in this application. It is my belief that a different approach-a different mathematics-is needed, and that AI provides just this approach. (Hand, quoted in Hand, 1985, pp. 6-7)
       We might distinguish among four kinds of AI.
       Research of this kind involves building and programming computers to perform tasks which, to paraphrase Marvin Minsky, would require intelligence if they were done by us. Researchers in nonpsychological AI make no claims whatsoever about the psychological realism of their programs or the devices they build, that is, about whether or not computers perform tasks as humans do.
       Research here is guided by the view that the computer is a useful tool in the study of mind. In particular, we can write computer programs or build devices that simulate alleged psychological processes in humans and then test our predictions about how the alleged processes work. We can weave these programs and devices together with other programs and devices that simulate different alleged mental processes and thereby test the degree to which the AI system as a whole simulates human mentality. According to weak psychological AI, working with computer models is a way of refining and testing hypotheses about processes that are allegedly realized in human minds.
    ... According to this view, our minds are computers and therefore can be duplicated by other computers. Sherry Turkle writes that the "real ambition is of mythic proportions, making a general purpose intelligence, a mind." (Turkle, 1984, p. 240) The authors of a major text announce that "the ultimate goal of AI research is to build a person or, more humbly, an animal." (Charniak & McDermott, 1985, p. 7)
       Research in this field, like strong psychological AI, takes seriously the functionalist view that mentality can be realized in many different types of physical devices. Suprapsychological AI, however, accuses strong psychological AI of being chauvinisticof being only interested in human intelligence! Suprapsychological AI claims to be interested in all the conceivable ways intelligence can be realized. (Flanagan, 1991, pp. 241-242)
        16) Determination of Relevance of Rules in Particular Contexts
       Even if the [rules] were stored in a context-free form the computer still couldn't use them. To do that the computer requires rules enabling it to draw on just those [ rules] which are relevant in each particular context. Determination of relevance will have to be based on further facts and rules, but the question will again arise as to which facts and rules are relevant for making each particular determination. One could always invoke further facts and rules to answer this question, but of course these must be only the relevant ones. And so it goes. It seems that AI workers will never be able to get started here unless they can settle the problem of relevance beforehand by cataloguing types of context and listing just those facts which are relevant in each. (Dreyfus & Dreyfus, 1986, p. 80)
       Perhaps the single most important idea to artificial intelligence is that there is no fundamental difference between form and content, that meaning can be captured in a set of symbols such as a semantic net. (G. Johnson, 1986, p. 250)
        18) The Assumption That the Mind Is a Formal System
       Artificial intelligence is based on the assumption that the mind can be described as some kind of formal system manipulating symbols that stand for things in the world. Thus it doesn't matter what the brain is made of, or what it uses for tokens in the great game of thinking. Using an equivalent set of tokens and rules, we can do thinking with a digital computer, just as we can play chess using cups, salt and pepper shakers, knives, forks, and spoons. Using the right software, one system (the mind) can be mapped into the other (the computer). (G. Johnson, 1986, p. 250)
        19) A Statement of the Primary and Secondary Purposes of Artificial Intelligence
       The primary goal of Artificial Intelligence is to make machines smarter.
       The secondary goals of Artificial Intelligence are to understand what intelligence is (the Nobel laureate purpose) and to make machines more useful (the entrepreneurial purpose). (Winston, 1987, p. 1)
       The theoretical ideas of older branches of engineering are captured in the language of mathematics. We contend that mathematical logic provides the basis for theory in AI. Although many computer scientists already count logic as fundamental to computer science in general, we put forward an even stronger form of the logic-is-important argument....
       AI deals mainly with the problem of representing and using declarative (as opposed to procedural) knowledge. Declarative knowledge is the kind that is expressed as sentences, and AI needs a language in which to state these sentences. Because the languages in which this knowledge usually is originally captured (natural languages such as English) are not suitable for computer representations, some other language with the appropriate properties must be used. It turns out, we think, that the appropriate properties include at least those that have been uppermost in the minds of logicians in their development of logical languages such as the predicate calculus. Thus, we think that any language for expressing knowledge in AI systems must be at least as expressive as the first-order predicate calculus. (Genesereth & Nilsson, 1987, p. viii)
        21) Perceptual Structures Can Be Represented as Lists of Elementary Propositions
       In artificial intelligence studies, perceptual structures are represented as assemblages of description lists, the elementary components of which are propositions asserting that certain relations hold among elements. (Chase & Simon, 1988, p. 490)
       Artificial intelligence (AI) is sometimes defined as the study of how to build and/or program computers to enable them to do the sorts of things that minds can do. Some of these things are commonly regarded as requiring intelligence: offering a medical diagnosis and/or prescription, giving legal or scientific advice, proving theorems in logic or mathematics. Others are not, because they can be done by all normal adults irrespective of educational background (and sometimes by non-human animals too), and typically involve no conscious control: seeing things in sunlight and shadows, finding a path through cluttered terrain, fitting pegs into holes, speaking one's own native tongue, and using one's common sense. Because it covers AI research dealing with both these classes of mental capacity, this definition is preferable to one describing AI as making computers do "things that would require intelligence if done by people." However, it presupposes that computers could do what minds can do, that they might really diagnose, advise, infer, and understand. One could avoid this problematic assumption (and also side-step questions about whether computers do things in the same way as we do) by defining AI instead as "the development of computers whose observable performance has features which in humans we would attribute to mental processes." This bland characterization would be acceptable to some AI workers, especially amongst those focusing on the production of technological tools for commercial purposes. But many others would favour a more controversial definition, seeing AI as the science of intelligence in general-or, more accurately, as the intellectual core of cognitive science. As such, its goal is to provide a systematic theory that can explain (and perhaps enable us to replicate) both the general categories of intentionality and the diverse psychological capacities grounded in them. (Boden, 1990b, pp. 1-2)
       Because the ability to store data somewhat corresponds to what we call memory in human beings, and because the ability to follow logical procedures somewhat corresponds to what we call reasoning in human beings, many members of the cult have concluded that what computers do somewhat corresponds to what we call thinking. It is no great difficulty to persuade the general public of that conclusion since computers process data very fast in small spaces well below the level of visibility; they do not look like other machines when they are at work. They seem to be running along as smoothly and silently as the brain does when it remembers and reasons and thinks. On the other hand, those who design and build computers know exactly how the machines are working down in the hidden depths of their semiconductors. Computers can be taken apart, scrutinized, and put back together. Their activities can be tracked, analyzed, measured, and thus clearly understood-which is far from possible with the brain. This gives rise to the tempting assumption on the part of the builders and designers that computers can tell us something about brains, indeed, that the computer can serve as a model of the mind, which then comes to be seen as some manner of information processing machine, and possibly not as good at the job as the machine. (Roszak, 1994, pp. xiv-xv)
       The inner workings of the human mind are far more intricate than the most complicated systems of modern technology. Researchers in the field of artificial intelligence have been attempting to develop programs that will enable computers to display intelligent behavior. Although this field has been an active one for more than thirty-five years and has had many notable successes, AI researchers still do not know how to create a program that matches human intelligence. No existing program can recall facts, solve problems, reason, learn, and process language with human facility. This lack of success has occurred not because computers are inferior to human brains but rather because we do not yet know in sufficient detail how intelligence is organized in the brain. (Anderson, 1995, p. 2)

    Historical dictionary of quotations in cognitive science > Artificial Intelligence

  • 3 involve

    in'volv
    1) (to require; to bring as a result: His job involves a lot of travelling.) suponer, implicar
    2) ((often with in or with) to cause to take part in or to be mixed up in: He has always been involved in/with the theatre; Don't ask my advice - I don't want to be/get involved.) implicar, envolver
    •
    - involvement
    1. implicar / enredar
    I don't mind what you do, as long as you don't involve me no me importa lo que hagas, mientras no me impliques a mí
    2. suponer / implicar
    tr[ɪn'vɒlv]
    1 (entail) suponer, implicar, conllevar; (give rise to) acarrear, ocasionar
    ■ what does the job involve? ¿en qué consiste el trabajo?
    2 (include, affect, concern) tener que ver con, afectar a
    3 (implicar) implicar, involucrar, meter
    \
    SMALLIDIOMATIC EXPRESSION/SMALL
    to involve oneself in something tomar parte en algo
    involve [ɪn'vɑlv] vt, - volved ; - volving
    1) engage: ocupar
    workers involved in construction: trabajadores ocupados con la construcción
    2) implicate: involucrar, enredar, implicar
    to be involved in a crime: estar involucrado en un crimen
    3) concern: concernir, afectar
    4) connect: conectar, relacionar
    5) entail, include: suponer, incluir, consistir en
    what does the job involve?: ¿en qué consiste el trabajo?
    6)
    to be involved with someone : tener una relación (amorosa) con alguien
    v.
    • complicar v.
    • comprometer v.
    • concernir v.
    • encubrir v.
    • enredar v.
    • entrañar v.
    • envolver v.
    • enzarzar v.
    • implicar v.
    • importar v.
    • interesar v.
    • involucrar v.
    • liar v.
    ɪn'vɑːlv, ɪn'vɒlv
    1)
    a) (entail, comprise) suponer*

    what exactly does your work involve? — ¿en qué consiste exactamente tu trabajo?

    b) (affect, concern)

    where national security is involved... — cuando se trata de la seguridad nacional...

    2)

    to involve somebody IN something/-ING — ( implicate) implicar* or involucrar a alguien en algo; ( allow to participate) darle* participación a alguien en algo

    3) involved past p
    a)

    to be/get involved IN something — (implicated, associated)

    whenever there's an argument, he has to get involved — siempre que hay una pelea, él tiene que meterse

    to be/get involved WITH somebody/something: the people you're involved with la gente con la que andas metido or mezclado; how did you get involved with people like them? — ¿cómo te mezclaste con gente de esa calaña?

    b)

    to be involved IN something — ( engrossed) estar* absorto or enfrascado en algo; ( busy) estar* ocupado con algo

    to be/get involved WITH somebody/something — estar* dedicado/dedicarse* a alguien/algo

    to be/get involved WITH somebody: she doesn't want to get too involved with him — no quiere llegar a una relación muy seria con él

    [ɪn'vɒlv]
    VT
    1) (=implicate, associate) implicar, involucrar

    the persons involved — (gen) los interesados; (=culprits) los implicados

    • to be involved (in sth), how did he come to be involved? — ¿cómo llegó a meterse en esto?

    he/his car was involved in an accident — él/su coche se vio involucrado en un accidente

    I was so involved in my book that... — estaba tan absorto en el libro que...

    • to become or get involved (in sth), the police became involved — la policía tomó cartas en el asunto

    • to be/become/get involved with sth/sb, she's so involved with the project she doesn't have time for me — está tan liada * con el proyecto que no tiene tiempo para mí, el proyecto la absorbe tanto que no tiene tiempo para mí

    she likes him but she doesn't want to get involved — él le gusta, pero no quiere comprometerse

    2) (=entail, imply) suponer

    it involved a lot of expense — supuso or acarreó muchos gastos

    there's a good deal of work involved — supone or implica bastante trabajo

    what does your job involve? — ¿en qué consiste su trabajo?

    how much money is involved? — ¿cuánto dinero hay en juego?

    * * *
    [ɪn'vɑːlv, ɪn'vɒlv]
    1)
    a) (entail, comprise) suponer*

    what exactly does your work involve? — ¿en qué consiste exactamente tu trabajo?

    b) (affect, concern)

    where national security is involved... — cuando se trata de la seguridad nacional...

    2)

    to involve somebody IN something/-ING — ( implicate) implicar* or involucrar a alguien en algo; ( allow to participate) darle* participación a alguien en algo

    3) involved past p
    a)

    to be/get involved IN something — (implicated, associated)

    whenever there's an argument, he has to get involved — siempre que hay una pelea, él tiene que meterse

    to be/get involved WITH somebody/something: the people you're involved with la gente con la que andas metido or mezclado; how did you get involved with people like them? — ¿cómo te mezclaste con gente de esa calaña?

    b)

    to be involved IN something — ( engrossed) estar* absorto or enfrascado en algo; ( busy) estar* ocupado con algo

    to be/get involved WITH somebody/something — estar* dedicado/dedicarse* a alguien/algo

    to be/get involved WITH somebody: she doesn't want to get too involved with him — no quiere llegar a una relación muy seria con él

    English-spanish dictionary > involve

  • 4 Thinking

       But what then am I? A thing which thinks. What is a thing which thinks? It is a thing which doubts, understands, [conceives], affirms, denies, wills, refuses, which also imagines and feels. (Descartes, 1951, p. 153)
       I have been trying in all this to remove the temptation to think that there "must be" a mental process of thinking, hoping, wishing, believing, etc., independent of the process of expressing a thought, a hope, a wish, etc.... If we scrutinize the usages which we make of "thinking," "meaning," "wishing," etc., going through this process rids us of the temptation to look for a peculiar act of thinking, independent of the act of expressing our thoughts, and stowed away in some particular medium. (Wittgenstein, 1958, pp. 41-43)
       Analyse the proofs employed by the subject. If they do not go beyond observation of empirical correspondences, they can be fully explained in terms of concrete operations, and nothing would warrant our assuming that more complex thought mechanisms are operating. If, on the other hand, the subject interprets a given correspondence as the result of any one of several possible combinations, and this leads him to verify his hypotheses by observing their consequences, we know that propositional operations are involved. (Inhelder & Piaget, 1958, p. 279)
       In every age, philosophical thinking exploits some dominant concepts and makes its greatest headway in solving problems conceived in terms of them. The seventeenth- and eighteenth-century philosophers construed knowledge, knower, and known in terms of sense data and their association. Descartes' self-examination gave classical psychology the mind and its contents as a starting point. Locke set up sensory immediacy as the new criterion of the real... Hobbes provided the genetic method of building up complex ideas from simple ones... and, in another quarter, still true to the Hobbesian method, Pavlov built intellect out of conditioned reflexes and Loeb built life out of tropisms. (S. Langer, 1962, p. 54)
       Experiments on deductive reasoning show that subjects are influenced sufficiently by their experience for their reasoning to differ from that described by a purely deductive system, whilst experiments on inductive reasoning lead to the view that an understanding of the strategies used by adult subjects in attaining concepts involves reference to higher-order concepts of a logical and deductive nature. (Bolton, 1972, p. 154)
       There are now machines in the world that think, that learn and create. Moreover, their ability to do these things is going to increase rapidly until-in the visible future-the range of problems they can handle will be coextensive with the range to which the human mind has been applied. (Newell & Simon, quoted in Weizenbaum, 1976, p. 138)
       But how does it happen that thinking is sometimes accompanied by action and sometimes not, sometimes by motion, and sometimes not? It looks as if almost the same thing happens as in the case of reasoning and making inferences about unchanging objects. But in that case the end is a speculative proposition... whereas here the conclusion which results from the two premises is an action.... I need covering; a cloak is a covering. I need a cloak. What I need, I have to make; I need a cloak. I have to make a cloak. And the conclusion, the "I have to make a cloak," is an action. (Nussbaum, 1978, p. 40)
       It is well to remember that when philosophy emerged in Greece in the sixth century, B.C., it did not burst suddenly out of the Mediterranean blue. The development of societies of reasoning creatures-what we call civilization-had been a process to be measured not in thousands but in millions of years. Human beings became civilized as they became reasonable, and for an animal to begin to reason and to learn how to improve its reasoning is a long, slow process. So thinking had been going on for ages before Greece-slowly improving itself, uncovering the pitfalls to be avoided by forethought, endeavoring to weigh alternative sets of consequences intellectually. What happened in the sixth century, B.C., is that thinking turned round on itself; people began to think about thinking, and the momentous event, the culmination of the long process to that point, was in fact the birth of philosophy. (Lipman, Sharp & Oscanyan, 1980, p. xi)
       The way to look at thought is not to assume that there is a parallel thread of correlated affects or internal experiences that go with it in some regular way. It's not of course that people don't have internal experiences, of course they do; but that when you ask what is the state of mind of someone, say while he or she is performing a ritual, it's hard to believe that such experiences are the same for all people involved.... The thinking, and indeed the feeling in an odd sort of way, is really going on in public. They are really saying what they're saying, doing what they're doing, meaning what they're meaning. Thought is, in great part anyway, a public activity. (Geertz, quoted in J. Miller, 1983, pp. 202-203)
       Everything should be made as simple as possible, but not simpler. (Einstein, quoted in Minsky, 1986, p. 17)
       What, in effect, are the conditions for the construction of formal thought? The child must not only apply operations to objects-in other words, mentally execute possible actions on them-he must also "reflect" those operations in the absence of the objects which are replaced by pure propositions. Thus, "reflection" is thought raised to the second power. Concrete thinking is the representation of a possible action, and formal thinking is the representation of a representation of possible action.... It is not surprising, therefore, that the system of concrete operations must be completed during the last years of childhood before it can be "reflected" by formal operations. In terms of their function, formal operations do not differ from concrete operations except that they are applied to hypotheses or propositions [whose logic is] an abstract translation of the system of "inference" that governs concrete operations. (Piaget, quoted in Minsky, 1986, p. 237)
       [E]ven a human being today (hence, a fortiori, a remote ancestor of contemporary human beings) cannot easily or ordinarily maintain uninterrupted attention on a single problem for more than a few tens of seconds. Yet we work on problems that require vastly more time. The way we do that (as we can observe by watching ourselves) requires periods of mulling to be followed by periods of recapitulation, describing to ourselves what seems to have gone on during the mulling, leading to whatever intermediate results we have reached. This has an obvious function: namely, by rehearsing these interim results... we commit them to memory, for the immediate contents of the stream of consciousness are very quickly lost unless rehearsed.... Given language, we can describe to ourselves what seemed to occur during the mulling that led to a judgment, produce a rehearsable version of the reaching-a-judgment process, and commit that to long-term memory by in fact rehearsing it. (Margolis, 1987, p. 60)

    Historical dictionary of quotations in cognitive science > Thinking

  • 5 involve

    A vtr
    1 ( entail) impliquer, nécessiter [effort, travel] ; entraîner [danger, problems] ; to involve doing [job, sport, policy, plan] impliquer or nécessiter de faire ; it involves leaving early cela implique or nécessite de partir tôt ; there is a lot of work/effort involved cela implique beaucoup de travail/d'efforts ; there is some travelling/lifting involved cela nécessite de voyager/porter des charges ; the work involves computers le travail concerne les ordinateurs ;
    2 ( cause to participate) gen faire participer [person, group] (in à) ; ( implicate) impliquer, mêler [person, group] (in dans) ; to be involved in ( positive) participer à, être engagé dans [business, project] ; ( negative) être mêlé à [scandal, robbery, fight] ; to be involved in doing s'occuper de faire ; to get involved in ou with sth gen se trouver engagé dans qch ; ( in sth dubious) se trouver mêlé à qch ; not to get involved in ou with sth rester à l'écart de qch ; it will involve them in heavy expenditure ça va les entraîner à de grosses dépenses ; to feel involved se sentir impliqué ;
    3 ( affect) concerner, impliquer [person, animal, vehicle] ; three people were involved in the accident trois personnes étaient impliquées dans l'accident ; our future/their safety is involved notre avenir/leur sécurité est en jeu ;
    4 ( engross) [film, play, book] faire participer, prendre [person, audience] ; to be involved in être pris par, être plongé dans [film, book, work] ; to get involved in se laisser prendre par, se plonger dans [film, play, book, work] ;
    5 ( get emotionally attached) to be/get involved with être/devenir proche de [patient, client] ; ( romantically) avoir une liaison avec [person] ; to be (too) involved in ou with prendre [qch] à cœur [problem, situation] ; you're too involved to make a judgment tu es trop concerné pour porter un jugement ;
    6 ( make a commitment) to get involved s'engager ; I don't want to get involved je ne veux pas m'engager.
    B v refl to involve oneself in ou with ( participate) prendre part à [project, task].

    Big English-French dictionary > involve

  • 6 experience

    1. noun
    1) no pl., no indef. art. Erfahrung, die

    have experience of something/somebody — Erfahrung in etwas (Dat.) /mit jemandem haben

    have experience of doing something — Erfahrung darin haben, etwas zu tun

    learn from experience — durch eigene od. aus eigener Erfahrung lernen

    in/from my [own] [previous] experience — nach meiner/aus eigener Erfahrung

    2) (event) Erfahrung, die; Erlebnis, das
    2. transitive verb
    erleben; stoßen auf (+ Akk.) [Schwierigkeiten]; kennen lernen [Lebensweise]; empfinden [Hunger, Kälte, Schmerz]
    * * *
    [ik'spiəriəns] 1. noun
    1) ((knowledge, skill or wisdom gained through) practice in some activity, or the doing of something: Learn by experience - don't make the same mistake again; Has she had experience in teaching?)
    2) (an event that affects or involves a person etc: The earthquake was a terrible experience.) das Erlebnis
    2. verb
    (to have experience of; to feel: I have never before experienced such rudeness!) erfahren, erleben
    - academic.ru/25757/experienced">experienced
    * * *
    ex·peri·ence
    [ɪkˈspɪəriən(t)s, ek-, AM -ˈspɪr-]
    I. n
    1. no pl (practical knowledge) Erfahrung f
    \experience of life Lebenserfahrung f
    driving \experience Fahrpraxis f
    professional \experience Berufserfahrung f
    to learn by \experience durch Erfahrung lernen
    the best way to learn is by \experience aus Erfahrung wird man klug
    from my own \experience aus eigener Erfahrung
    to know sth from \experience etw aus Erfahrung wissen
    ▪ to have \experience in sth field Erfahrung in etw dat haben
    ▪ to have \experience of sth Erfahrung mit [o in] etw dat haben
    2. (particular instance) Erfahrung f, Erlebnis nt
    enjoy the real coffee \experience erleben Sie den wahren Kaffeegenuss!
    that can be a painful \experience das kann ganz schön weh tun
    \experience of pain Schmerzempfinden nt
    to have an \experience eine Erfahrung machen
    3.
    ▶ to put sth down to \experience etw als Erfahrung abbuchen [o betrachten
    II. vt
    ▪ to \experience sth
    1. (undergo) etw erleben; (endure) etw kennenlernen, etw erfahren; hard times etw durchmachen [o fam mitmachen]
    to \experience difficulties auf Schwierigkeiten stoßen
    2. (feel) etw empfinden [o fühlen]
    to \experience a loss einen Verlust erleiden
    * * *
    [Ik'spIərɪəns]
    1. n
    1) (= knowledge, wisdom acquired) Erfahrung f

    experience shows or proves that... — die Erfahrung lehrt, dass...

    to learn/speak from experience — aus eigener Erfahrung lernen/sprechen

    he has no experience of grief — er hat nie Kummer erfahren or erlebt

    2) (= practice, skill) Erfahrung f

    he has had no practical experience — ihm fehlt die Praxis, er hat keine praktischen Kenntnisse or keine praktische Erfahrung

    experience in a job/in business — Berufs-/Geschäftserfahrung f

    he is working in a factory to gain experience — er arbeitet in einer Fabrik, um praktische Erfahrungen zu sammeln

    3) (= event experienced) Erlebnis nt

    I had a nasty experience —

    the trial was a very nasty experience — der Prozess war eine sehr unangenehme Sache

    it was a painful experience — es war schmerzlich (geh)

    2. vt
    1) (= suffer, undergo) pain, grief, hunger erfahren, erleben; difficult times, recession durchmachen; problems, symptoms haben

    to experience difficulties — auf Schwierigkeiten stoßen, Schwierigkeiten haben

    2) (= feel) fühlen, spüren, empfinden
    * * *
    experience [ıkˈspıərıəns]
    A s
    1. Erfahrung f, (Lebens)Praxis f:
    by ( oder from) my own experience aus eigener Erfahrung;
    speak from (bitter) experience aus (bitterer) Erfahrung sprechen;
    based on experience auf Erfahrung begründet;
    I know (it) by experience ich weiß (es) aus Erfahrung;
    in my experience nach meinen Erfahrungen, meines Wissens
    2. Erlebnis n:
    I had a strange experience ich hatte ein seltsames Erlebnis, ich habe etwas Seltsames erlebt;
    he had an unpleasant experience er machte eine unangenehme Erfahrung;
    3. Erfahrenheit f, (praktische) Erfahrung, Fach-, Sachkenntnis f, Routine f:
    have a lot of experience doing sth viel Erfahrung darin haben, etwas zu tun;
    experience is the best teacher (Sprichwort) Erfahrung ist die beste Lehrmeisterin
    4. REL
    a) Erfahrungsreligion f
    b) US religiöse Erweckung:
    experience meeting Erweckungsversammlung f
    B v/t erfahren:
    a) kennenlernen
    b) erleben:
    experience sth personally etwas am eigenen Leibe erfahren;
    experience difficulties auf Schwierigkeiten stoßen
    c) Schmerzen, Verluste etc erleiden, etwas durchmachen, Vergnügen etc empfinden:
    experience an advance WIRTSCH eine Kurssteigerung erfahren;
    experience religion US umg erweckt oder bekehrt werden
    * * *
    1. noun
    1) no pl., no indef. art. Erfahrung, die

    have experience of something/somebody — Erfahrung in etwas (Dat.) /mit jemandem haben

    have experience of doing something — Erfahrung darin haben, etwas zu tun

    learn from experience — durch eigene od. aus eigener Erfahrung lernen

    in/from my [own] [previous] experience — nach meiner/aus eigener Erfahrung

    2) (event) Erfahrung, die; Erlebnis, das
    2. transitive verb
    erleben; stoßen auf (+ Akk.) [Schwierigkeiten]; kennen lernen [Lebensweise]; empfinden [Hunger, Kälte, Schmerz]
    * * *
    n.
    Erfahrenheit f.
    Erfahrung f.
    Erlebnis -se n.
    Routine -n f.

    English-german dictionary > experience

  • 7 Empire, Portuguese overseas

    (1415-1975)
       Portugal was the first Western European state to establish an early modern overseas empire beyond the Mediterranean and perhaps the last colonial power to decolonize. A vast subject of complexity that is full of myth as well as debatable theories, the history of the Portuguese overseas empire involves the story of more than one empire, the question of imperial motives, the nature of Portuguese rule, and the results and consequences of empire, including the impact on subject peoples as well as on the mother country and its society, Here, only the briefest account of a few such issues can be attempted.
       There were various empires or phases of empire after the capture of the Moroccan city of Ceuta in 1415. There were at least three Portuguese empires in history: the First empire (1415-1580), the Second empire (1580-1640 and 1640-1822), and the Third empire (1822-1975).
       With regard to the second empire, the so-called Phillipine period (1580-1640), when Portugal's empire was under Spanish domination, could almost be counted as a separate era. During that period, Portugal lost important parts of its Asian holdings to England and also sections of its colonies of Brazil, Angola, and West Africa to Holland's conquests. These various empires could be characterized by the geography of where Lisbon invested its greatest efforts and resources to develop territories and ward off enemies.
       The first empire (1415-1580) had two phases. First came the African coastal phase (1415-97), when the Portuguese sought a foothold in various Moroccan cities but then explored the African coast from Morocco to past the Cape of Good Hope in South Africa. While colonization and sugar farming were pursued in the Atlantic islands, as well as in the islands in the Gulf of Guinea like São Tomé and Príncipe, for the most part the Portuguese strategy was to avoid commitments to defending or peopling lands on the African continent. Rather, Lisbon sought a seaborne trade empire, in which the Portuguese could profit from exploiting trade and resources (such as gold) along the coasts and continue exploring southward to seek a sea route to Portuguese India. The second phase of the first empire (1498-1580) began with the discovery of the sea route to Asia, thanks to Vasco da Gama's first voyage in 1497-99, and the capture of strong points, ports, and trading posts in order to enforce a trade monopoly between Asia and Europe. This Asian phase produced the greatest revenues of empire Portugal had garnered, yet ended when Spain conquered Portugal and commanded her empire as of 1580.
       Portugal's second overseas empire began with Spanish domination and ran to 1822, when Brazil won her independence from Portugal. This phase was characterized largely by Brazilian dominance of imperial commitment, wealth in minerals and other raw materials from Brazil, and the loss of a significant portion of her African and Asian coastal empire to Holland and Great Britain. A sketch of Portugal's imperial losses either to native rebellions or to imperial rivals like Britain and Holland follows:
       • Morocco (North Africa) (sample only)
       Arzila—Taken in 1471; evacuated in 1550s; lost to Spain in 1580, which returned city to a sultan.
       Ceuta—Taken in 1415; lost to Spain in 1640 (loss confirmed in 1668 treaty with Spain).
       • Tangiers—Taken in 15th century; handed over to England in 1661 as part of Catherine of Braganza's dowry to King Charles II.
       • West Africa
       • Fort/Castle of São Jorge da Mina, Gold Coast (in what is now Ghana)—Taken in 1480s; lost to Holland in 1630s.
       • Middle East
       Socotra-isle—Conquered in 1507; fort abandoned in 1511; used as water resupply stop for India fleet.
       Muscat—Conquered in 1501; lost to Persians in 1650.
       Ormuz—Taken, 1505-15 under Albuquerque; lost to England, which gave it to Persia in the 17th century.
       Aden (entry to Red Sea) — Unsuccessfully attacked by Portugal (1513-30); taken by Turks in 1538.
       • India
       • Ceylon (Sri Lanka)—Taken by 1516; lost to Dutch after 1600.
       • Bombay—Taken in 16th century; given to England in 1661 treaty as part of Catherine of Braganza's dowry for Charles II.
       • East Indies
       • Moluccas—Taken by 1520; possession confirmed in 1529 Saragossa treaty with Spain; lost to Dutch after 1600; only East Timor remaining.
       After the restoration of Portuguese independence from Spain in 1640, Portugal proceeded to revive and strengthen the Anglo- Portuguese Alliance, with international aid to fight off further Spanish threats to Portugal and drive the Dutch invaders out of Brazil and Angola. While Portugal lost its foothold in West Africa at Mina to the Dutch, dominion in Angola was consolidated. The most vital part of the imperial economy was a triangular trade: slaves from West Africa and from the coasts of Congo and Angola were shipped to plantations in Brazil; raw materials (sugar, tobacco, gold, diamonds, dyes) were sent to Lisbon; Lisbon shipped Brazil colonists and hardware. Part of Portugal's War of Restoration against Spain (1640-68) and its reclaiming of Brazil and Angola from Dutch intrusions was financed by the New Christians (Jews converted to Christianity after the 1496 Manueline order of expulsion of Jews) who lived in Portugal, Holland and other low countries, France, and Brazil. If the first empire was mainly an African coastal and Asian empire, the second empire was primarily a Brazilian empire.
       Portugal's third overseas empire began upon the traumatic independence of Brazil, the keystone of the Lusitanian enterprise, in 1822. The loss of Brazil greatly weakened Portugal both as a European power and as an imperial state, for the scattered remainder of largely coastal, poor, and uncolonized territories that stretched from the bulge of West Africa to East Timor in the East Indies and Macau in south China were more of a financial liability than an asset. Only two small territories balanced their budgets occasionally or made profits: the cocoa islands of São Tomé and Príncipe in the Gulf of Guinea and tiny Macau, which lost much of its advantage as an entrepot between the West and the East when the British annexed neighboring Hong Kong in 1842. The others were largely burdens on the treasury. The African colonies were strapped by a chronic economic problem: at a time when the slave trade and then slavery were being abolished under pressures from Britain and other Western powers, the economies of Guinea- Bissau, São Tomé/Príncipe, Angola, and Mozambique were totally dependent on revenues from the slave trade and slavery. During the course of the 19th century, Lisbon began a program to reform colonial administration in a newly rejuvenated African empire, where most of the imperial efforts were expended, by means of replacing the slave trade and slavery, with legitimate economic activities.
       Portugal participated in its own early version of the "Scramble" for Africa's interior during 1850-69, but discovered that the costs of imperial expansion were too high to allow effective occupation of the hinterlands. After 1875, Portugal participated in the international "Scramble for Africa" and consolidated its holdings in west and southern Africa, despite the failure of the contra-costa (to the opposite coast) plan, which sought to link up the interiors of Angola and Mozambique with a corridor in central Africa. Portugal's expansion into what is now Malawi, Zambia, and Zimbabwe (eastern section) in 1885-90 was thwarted by its oldest ally, Britain, under pressure from interest groups in South Africa, Scotland, and England. All things considered, Portugal's colonizing resources and energies were overwhelmed by the African empire it possessed after the frontier-marking treaties of 1891-1906. Lisbon could barely administer the massive area of five African colonies, whose total area comprised about 8 percent of the area of the colossal continent. The African territories alone were many times the size of tiny Portugal and, as of 1914, Portugal was the third colonial power in terms of size of area possessed in the world.
       The politics of Portugal's empire were deceptive. Lisbon remained obsessed with the fear that rival colonial powers, especially Germany and Britain, would undermine and then dismantle her African empire. This fear endured well into World War II. In developing and keeping her potentially rich African territories (especially mineral-rich Angola and strategically located Mozambique), however, the race against time was with herself and her subject peoples. Two major problems, both chronic, prevented Portugal from effective colonization (i.e., settling) and development of her African empire: the economic weakness and underdevelopment of the mother country and the fact that the bulk of Portuguese emigration after 1822 went to Brazil, Venezuela, the United States, and France, not to the colonies. These factors made it difficult to consolidate imperial control until it was too late; that is, until local African nationalist movements had organized and taken the field in insurgency wars that began in three of the colonies during the years 1961-64.
       Portugal's belated effort to revitalize control and to develop, in the truest sense of the word, Angola and Mozambique after 1961 had to be set against contemporary events in Europe, Africa, and Asia. While Portugal held on to a backward empire, other European countries like Britain, France, and Belgium were rapidly decolonizing their empires. Portugal's failure or unwillingness to divert the large streams of emigrants to her empire after 1850 remained a constant factor in this question. Prophetic were the words of the 19th-century economist Joaquim Oliveira Martins, who wrote in 1880 that Brazil was a better colony for Portugal than Africa and that the best colony of all would have been Portugal itself. As of the day of the Revolution of 25 April 1974, which sparked the final process of decolonization of the remainder of Portugal's third overseas empire, the results of the colonization program could be seen to be modest compared to the numbers of Portuguese emigrants outside the empire. Moreover, within a year, of some 600,000 Portuguese residing permanently in Angola and Mozambique, all but a few thousand had fled to South Africa or returned to Portugal.
       In 1974 and 1975, most of the Portuguese empire was decolonized or, in the case of East Timor, invaded and annexed by a foreign power before it could consolidate its independence. Only historic Macau, scheduled for transfer to the People's Republic of China in 1999, remained nominally under Portuguese control as a kind of footnote to imperial history. If Portugal now lacked a conventional overseas empire and was occupied with the challenges of integration in the European Union (EU), Lisbon retained another sort of informal dependency that was a new kind of empire: the empire of her scattered overseas Portuguese communities from North America to South America. Their numbers were at least six times greater than that of the last settlers of the third empire.

    Historical dictionary of Portugal > Empire, Portuguese overseas

  • 8 Creativity

       Put in this bald way, these aims sound utopian. How utopian they areor rather, how imminent their realization-depends on how broadly or narrowly we interpret the term "creative." If we are willing to regard all human complex problem solving as creative, then-as we will point out-successful programs for problem solving mechanisms that simulate human problem solvers already exist, and a number of their general characteristics are known. If we reserve the term "creative" for activities like discovery of the special theory of relativity or the composition of Beethoven's Seventh Symphony, then no example of a creative mechanism exists at the present time. (Simon, 1979, pp. 144-145)
       Among the questions that can now be given preliminary answers in computational terms are the following: how can ideas from very different sources be spontaneously thought of together? how can two ideas be merged to produce a new structure, which shows the influence of both ancestor ideas without being a mere "cut-and-paste" combination? how can the mind be "primed," so that one will more easily notice serendipitous ideas? why may someone notice-and remember-something fairly uninteresting, if it occurs in an interesting context? how can a brief phrase conjure up an entire melody from memory? and how can we accept two ideas as similar ("love" and "prove" as rhyming, for instance) in respect of a feature not identical in both? The features of connectionist AI models that suggest answers to these questions are their powers of pattern completion, graceful degradation, sensitization, multiple constraint satisfaction, and "best-fit" equilibration.... Here, the important point is that the unconscious, "insightful," associative aspects of creativity can be explained-in outline, at least-by AI methods. (Boden, 1996, p. 273)
       There thus appears to be an underlying similarity in the process involved in creative innovation and social independence, with common traits and postures required for expression of both behaviors. The difference is one of product-literary, musical, artistic, theoretical products on the one hand, opinions on the other-rather than one of process. In both instances the individual must believe that his perceptions are meaningful and valid and be willing to rely upon his own interpretations. He must trust himself sufficiently that even when persons express opinions counter to his own he can proceed on the basis of his own perceptions and convictions. (Coopersmith, 1967, p. 58)
       he average level of ego strength and emotional stability is noticeably higher among creative geniuses than among the general population, though it is possibly lower than among men of comparable intelligence and education who go into administrative and similar positions. High anxiety and excitability appear common (e.g. Priestley, Darwin, Kepler) but full-blown neurosis is quite rare. (Cattell & Butcher, 1970, p. 315)
       he insight that is supposed to be required for such work as discovery turns out to be synonymous with the familiar process of recognition; and other terms commonly used in the discussion of creative work-such terms as "judgment," "creativity," or even "genius"-appear to be wholly dispensable or to be definable, as insight is, in terms of mundane and well-understood concepts. (Simon, 1989, p. 376)
       From the sketch material still in existence, from the condition of the fragments, and from the autographs themselves we can draw definite conclusions about Mozart's creative process. To invent musical ideas he did not need any stimulation; they came to his mind "ready-made" and in polished form. In contrast to Beethoven, who made numerous attempts at shaping his musical ideas until he found the definitive formulation of a theme, Mozart's first inspiration has the stamp of finality. Any Mozart theme has completeness and unity; as a phenomenon it is a Gestalt. (Herzmann, 1964, p. 28)
       Great artists enlarge the limits of one's perception. Looking at the world through the eyes of Rembrandt or Tolstoy makes one able to perceive aspects of truth about the world which one could not have achieved without their aid. Freud believed that science was adaptive because it facilitated mastery of the external world; but was it not the case that many scientific theories, like works of art, also originated in phantasy? Certainly, reading accounts of scientific discovery by men of the calibre of Einstein compelled me to conclude that phantasy was not merely escapist, but a way of reaching new insights concerning the nature of reality. Scientific hypotheses require proof; works of art do not. Both are concerned with creating order, with making sense out of the world and our experience of it. (Storr, 1993, p. xii)
       The importance of self-esteem for creative expression appears to be almost beyond disproof. Without a high regard for himself the individual who is working in the frontiers of his field cannot trust himself to discriminate between the trivial and the significant. Without trust in his own powers the person seeking improved solutions or alternative theories has no basis for distinguishing the significant and profound innovation from the one that is merely different.... An essential component of the creative process, whether it be analysis, synthesis, or the development of a new perspective or more comprehensive theory, is the conviction that one's judgment in interpreting the events is to be trusted. (Coopersmith, 1967, p. 59)
       In the daily stream of thought these four different stages [preparation; incubation; illumination or inspiration; and verification] constantly overlap each other as we explore different problems. An economist reading a Blue Book, a physiologist watching an experiment, or a business man going through his morning's letters, may at the same time be "incubating" on a problem which he proposed to himself a few days ago, be accumulating knowledge in "preparation" for a second problem, and be "verifying" his conclusions to a third problem. Even in exploring the same problem, the mind may be unconsciously incubating on one aspect of it, while it is consciously employed in preparing for or verifying another aspect. (Wallas, 1926, p. 81)
       he basic, bisociative pattern of the creative synthesis [is] the sudden interlocking of two previously unrelated skills, or matrices of thought. (Koestler, 1964, p. 121)
        11) The Earliest Stages in the Creative Process Involve a Commerce with Disorder
       Even to the creator himself, the earliest effort may seem to involve a commerce with disorder. For the creative order, which is an extension of life, is not an elaboration of the established, but a movement beyond the established, or at least a reorganization of it and often of elements not included in it. The first need is therefore to transcend the old order. Before any new order can be defined, the absolute power of the established, the hold upon us of what we know and are, must be broken. New life comes always from outside our world, as we commonly conceive that world. This is the reason why, in order to invent, one must yield to the indeterminate within him, or, more precisely, to certain illdefined impulses which seem to be of the very texture of the ungoverned fullness which John Livingston Lowes calls "the surging chaos of the unexpressed." (Ghiselin, 1985, p. 4)
       New life comes always from outside our world, as we commonly conceive our world. This is the reason why, in order to invent, one must yield to the indeterminate within him, or, more precisely, to certain illdefined impulses which seem to be of the very texture of the ungoverned fullness which John Livingston Lowes calls "the surging chaos of the unexpressed." Chaos and disorder are perhaps the wrong terms for that indeterminate fullness and activity of the inner life. For it is organic, dynamic, full of tension and tendency. What is absent from it, except in the decisive act of creation, is determination, fixity, and commitment to one resolution or another of the whole complex of its tensions. (Ghiselin, 1952, p. 13)
       [P]sychoanalysts have principally been concerned with the content of creative products, and with explaining content in terms of the artist's infantile past. They have paid less attention to examining why the artist chooses his particular activity to express, abreact or sublimate his emotions. In short, they have not made much distinction between art and neurosis; and, since the former is one of the blessings of mankind, whereas the latter is one of the curses, it seems a pity that they should not be better differentiated....
       Psychoanalysis, being fundamentally concerned with drive and motive, might have been expected to throw more light upon what impels the creative person that in fact it has. (Storr, 1993, pp. xvii, 3)
       A number of theoretical approaches were considered. Associative theory, as developed by Mednick (1962), gained some empirical support from the apparent validity of the Remote Associates Test, which was constructed on the basis of the theory.... Koestler's (1964) bisociative theory allows more complexity to mental organization than Mednick's associative theory, and postulates "associative contexts" or "frames of reference." He proposed that normal, non-creative, thought proceeds within particular contexts or frames and that the creative act involves linking together previously unconnected frames.... Simonton (1988) has developed associative notions further and explored the mathematical consequences of chance permutation of ideas....
       Like Koestler, Gruber (1980; Gruber and Davis, 1988) has based his analysis on case studies. He has focused especially on Darwin's development of the theory of evolution. Using piagetian notions, such as assimilation and accommodation, Gruber shows how Darwin's system of ideas changed very slowly over a period of many years. "Moments of insight," in Gruber's analysis, were the culminations of slow long-term processes.... Finally, the information-processing approach, as represented by Simon (1966) and Langley et al. (1987), was considered.... [Simon] points out the importance of good problem representations, both to ensure search is in an appropriate problem space and to aid in developing heuristic evaluations of possible research directions.... The work of Langley et al. (1987) demonstrates how such search processes, realized in computer programs, can indeed discover many basic laws of science from tables of raw data.... Boden (1990a, 1994) has stressed the importance of restructuring the problem space in creative work to develop new genres and paradigms in the arts and sciences. (Gilhooly, 1996, pp. 243-244; emphasis in original)

    Historical dictionary of quotations in cognitive science > Creativity

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